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Non–technical summary
Print media markets, that is newspaper and magazine markets, have a very
specific feature: actors are faced by two demand curves, the demand for the
print medium itself and the demand for advertising space contained in the print
medium. These demand curves are interrelated since advertising demand is
mainly determined by circulation and print medium purchasers value advertising
— at least to some extent. This interrelationship leads to the empirically well
documented phenomenon that print media firms charge cover prices that are be-
low marginal production cost.
The demand interrelationship weakens competitive concerns with respect to the
recent concentration of print media industries. This paper shows that the demand
interrelationship causes print media firms to charge cover prices that are below
cover prices in the case of non–existence of the demand interrelationship. It also
establishes the conditions under which print media firms price below marginal
cost. Unlike earlier literature that makes somewhat unrealistic assumptions re-
garding print media firms’ influence on the advertising market, I show that cover
prices in monopoly are always higher than under perfect competition.
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Abstract: Actors on print media markets face two different (and interrelated)
demand curves: the demand for copies and the demand for advertising space.
This paper develops a realistic, yet simple, model of print media industries. In
contrast to earlier studies, it takes into account that print media firms can neither
set advertising space nor its price. A main finding of this paper is that competi-
tive concerns regarding recent concentrations in print media industries are likely
to be overstated since a print media firms’ cover pricing is limited by its feedback
on advertising demand.
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1 Introduction
The effects of media concentration on newspaper and magazine prices has re-
mained high on the economic policy agenda for decades. A particularly well
documented instance of highly concentrated print media markets is Australia,
where only a handful players act on the newspaper market.2 Although Aus-
tralia presumably is an extreme case, many other countries, such as Italy with
the Berlusconi empire or Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. (as documented by
Wagner, 1982) nurse their own national champions. Having an in terms of inter-
pretability simple but still realistic model of the effects of media concentration
on prices at hand hence appears to be useful from an economic policy point of
view.
Print media markets come with one very special feature: actors are faced by two
different and interrelated demand curves, the demand for the print medium itself
and the demand for advertising space contained in the print medium. This leads
to a ‘demand interdependence’ (Rosse, 1978; as cited by Chaudhri, 1998, p. 60)
in the sense that changes in the circulation of the print medium induces changes
in the demand for advertising space and vice versa, at least if consumers value
advertising as it has been demonstrated by numerous studies (Kaiser 2002; Rosse
1970; Rysman 2000).
In a recent game–theoretical contribution to the discussion about market con-
duct in print media industries, Chaudhri (1998) sets up a model where print
media firms are quantity setters both in the circulation and advertising dimen-
sion. While the former appears to be very reasonable, assuming that print media
firms can set advertising space seems not to meet well with reality, even though
Chaudhri (1998) is consistent with almost the entire earlier literature that also
assumes that print media firms are either price setters or quantity setters in both
market dimensions (Blair and Romanao 1993; Bucklin et al. 1989; Corden 1952–
1953; Dertouzos and Trautman 1990; Ferguson 1983; Merrilees 1983, 1998; Rosse
1967,1970; Thompson 1989). Instead, it seems more reasonable to think of print
media firms to be faced by a demand curve for advertising space that is ‘out
there in the market’ in the sense that advertisers have a willingness to pay for
advertising space that depends upon the circulation of the print medium.
More recent papers that look at the market for advertising space such as Berry
and Waldfogel (1999), who analyze radio broadcasting, Rysman (2002), who in-
vestigates yellow pages, and Kaiser (2002), who looks at womens’ magazines,
straightforwardly make adverting dependent on the number of consumers ‘pro-
duced’ by media firms. The idea that advertising depends on the number of
readers produced by the print medium is presumably best illustrated by the
functional form assumption for inverse advertising demand for advertising cho-
2Studies on the Australian newspaper industry include Chaudhri (1998) and Merrilees (1983,
1998).
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sen by Berry and Waldfogel (1999) as well as by Kaiser (2002). Both papers pick
a constant elasticity framework where the inverse demand for advertising is given
by
pai = λi(q
c
i )
η, (1)
where η denotes the inverse price elasticity of advertising demand — or what
Corden (1952–1953, p. 182) termed ‘circulation elasticity’ —, qci denotes the
number of printed copies and pai denotes the price charged for an advertising
page by print medium i. The parameter λ is a demand–shift variable that might
for example capture the extent to which the print media firm focuses on specific
consumer groups.
The key idea followed in the present paper is that newspapers cannot set ad-
vertising apace (and neither advertising price) but that they rather determine
circulation, thereby defining inverse demand for advertising.
Although the present paper takes a very different initial model setup, it comes
to conclusions that are in line with Chaudhri (1998). First, the condition un-
der which print media firms charge cover prices below marginal production cost
is qualitatively the same as in Chaudhri. Second, the demand interdependence
between the market for print copies and the market for advertising space also is
qualitative the same as in Chaudhri. Third, I find that cover prices are higher un-
der monopoly than under perfect competition. One result is different compared
to existing studies, in particular to Chaudhri, who establishes the conditions un-
der which there might be welfare gains from moving from perfect competition to
monopoly because advertising clients may gain from monopolization. This main
difference is due to the simple fact that there is only one decision variable in
my model (instead of two in Chaudhri, who assumes that print media firms set
both circulation and advertising pages): circulation. In my model, media firms
decrease quantities under monopoly, thereby reducing the price they can charge
for advertising space.
By and large, the overlap in the findings suggest that even if earlier empirical
studies on print media markets (Dertouzos and Trautman 1990; Ferguson 1983;
Merrilees 1983; Rosse 1970; Thompson 1989) might not have reasonably speci-
fied the market for advertising space, the qualitative conclusions reached by these
studies might not be far off qualitatively from what would have been obtained
had these studies taken a more realistic model of advertising demand.
2 The model
The major flaw of the earlier existing literature on print media pricing is that it
is assumed that print media firms can determine the level of advertising. This
is, however, very unlikely to be the case since the number of advertising pages
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per issue depends on the attractiveness of the print medium from the advertising
clients’ perspective. Its attractiveness in turn mainly depends on the number of
copies sold. Consequently, it seems more realistic to consider the number of copies
sold to consumers as the only variable at the discretion of the print medium. The
print medium firms’ profit maximization problem hence is:3
maxqciΠi = (p
c
i [q
c
i ]−mci)qci + pai [qci ]qai − Fi, (2)
where pci denotes the cover price of print medium i, mci denotes marginal costs
accruing from producing one copy of the print medium and qai denotes the number
of advertising pages per print medium issue. The term Fi denotes fixed produc-
tion cost.
The next two subsections derive the corresponding first–order conditions for profit
maximization under monopoly and perfect competition and provide interpreta-
tions of the results.
2.1 The monopoly solution
Under monopoly, the profit–maximizing first–order condition is
∂Πi
∂qci
= pci +
∂pci
∂qci
qci −mci +
∂pai
∂qci
qai = 0 (3)
so that
pci = mci −
∂pci
∂qci
qci︸ ︷︷ ︸ −
∂pai
∂qci
qai︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
(+) (-)
‘usual’ markup
markup deterioration
(4)
The first–order condition can hence be decomposed into their ‘usual’ markup
term, ∂pci/∂q
c
i , and a ‘markup deterioration’, ∂p
a
i /∂q
c
i · qai . That is, print media
firms cannibalize the ‘usual’ markup in order to increase demand for advertising
space: charging a lower price induces an increasing magazine demand which in
turn raises the prices for advertising space.
Theorem 1: Magazine prices are smaller if the network effect from advertising
demand is taken into account.
3Note that an analogous model can be set up for price–setting games. I expose a quantity
setting game here for coherence with the earlier literature, in particular for coherence with
Chaudhri (1998). See Kaiser (2002) for a treatment of a price–setting game.
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Proof: Setting ∂pai /∂q
c
i · qai = 0, that is ignoring the network effect, leads to the
usual price–equals–marginal–cost–plus–markup equation:
pci = mci −
∂pci
∂qci
qci . (5)
Comparing Equation (5) to Equation (4) proofs Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 shows that fears regarding monopolization of newspaper and maga-
zine industries might be overstated since the print medium firms’ strategies are
restricted by the feedback of cover pricing on advertising demand.
Theorem 2: Magazines charge cover prices below marginal costs if (i) advertising
revenues are large relative to the revenues from selling the print medium, (ii) the
elasticity of advertising prices with respect to print media circulation is high and
(iii) the demand for the print medium is price elastic.
Proof: From Equation (4) we know that pci − mci = −∂pci/∂qci qci − ∂pai /∂qci qai .
Hence, pci < mci iff −∂pci/∂qci qci − ∂pai /∂qci qai < 0. Rewriting the latter in terms
of elasticities leads to
− 1
ηqci ,pci︸ ︷︷ ︸ < ηpai ,qci︸ ︷︷ ︸
qai p
a
i
qcip
c
i︸︷︷︸
inverse price elasticity of magazine sales/
elasticity of advertising advertising sales
print media prices w.r.t. ratio
demand circulation
(6)
which restates Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 is very intuitive: if consumers are highly price sensitive, charging a
lower price has a large impact on advertising sales. The magnitude of the nega-
tive incentive to charge high copy price depends on the sensitivity of advertising
prices with respect to circulation, weighted by the ratio of magazine sales to
advertising sales. This suggest that one might worry least about print media
industry concentration in markets where print media consumers are very price
sensitive.
Indeed, it is conventional wisdom that newspapers are sold below marginal pro-
duction cost (Blair and Romano 1993; Wagner 1981). Kaiser (2002) shows that
this is, quite unsurprisingly, also the case for magazine markets. Theorem 2 es-
tablishes the condition under which below–marginal cost pricing occurs.
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2.2 The solution under perfect competition
Under perfect competition, the demand for the print medium is perfectly elastic.
Price hence equals marginal costs plus the network effect:
pci = mci −
∂pai
∂qci
. (7)
Theorem 3: Print media prices are always smaller than marginal cost in the
case of perfect competition.
Proof: The proof is trivial from inspection of Equation (7).
The intuition behind Theorem 3 is simple: under perfect competition, and under
disregard of the network effect, the print media firms’ ‘usual’ markup is zero. If
network effects are present, the print media firm is given an incentive to price
below marginal cost because it can recoup the losses from producing the print
media by selling advertising space.
Theorem 4: Print media prices are smaller under perfect competition than un-
der monopoly.
Proof: The proof is trivial from comparing Equation (4) and Equation (7).
This is the main difference to earlier studies, and this difference arises from my
different assumptions regarding firms’ decision variables; while earlier studies as-
sume that print media firms have command over both the advertising and the
printed copy market, there is only one decision variable in my model. In my
framework, advertising prices are determined by circulation so that lower circu-
lation leads to lower advertising prices. This implies that advertisers are ‘equally
well off’ in either case (monopoly and perfect competition) as advertising price
automatically adjust via the reaction in circulation.
3 Conclusion
The print media market has one specific feature: market actors are faced by two
demand curves, the demand for the print medium and the demand for advertis-
ing space contained in the print medium. This demand interdependence between
advertising and circulation has important effects on firms’ strategic behavior and
on economic policy. In particular, it might pay off from the print medium firms’
perspective to price below marginal cost since low cover prices induce a higher
circulation and thus a higher demand for advertising.
In this paper I set up a simple, yet realistic, model of the print media industry.
I demonstrate the effects on the demand interdependence of print media firms’
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strategies and establish the conditions under which print media firms price below
marginal production cost.
From an economic policy point of view, the print media market presumably is a
market where we have to worry least about negative effects to consumers from
market concentration since the interrelation between the advertising market and
the print medium market forecloses excessive pricing.
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